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T he welfare state is a vast topic. This report looks at the content, the scope and the institutionalization of the concept of the welfare state in several contemporary constitutions, including 
the constitution of Bulgaria, as well as the implications and the options 
for legislative implementation of the principle. Parallel to that, the 
correlation between the liberal and the welfare state deserves special 
attention and even new interpretation, since in contemporary Western 
democracy the welfare state is the emanation of the liberal state and 
not its antipode, as the dogmatics, overlooking reality, schematize. 
The basic laws of the fourth constitutional generation, adopted 
after the Second World War in Western Europe, expressly proclaim 
or implicitly contain provisions, which institutionalize the concept 
of the welfare state.
Creating each of these constitutions, their drafters reached some common 
views, which followed the evolution of the legal and political doctrine, 
although being rather motivated by national constitutionalism.
According to Art. 2 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 
France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949 in its Art. 
20, par. 1 defines the state as a democratic and social federal republic. 
The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles 
of republican, democratic, and social government, based on the rule 
of law, within the meaning of the federal Basic Law (Art. 28, par. 1).
The Constitution of Spain, drafted in 1978, proclaims in its Art. 1 that 
the Spanish republic is constituted as a social and democratic state.
Three other constitutions – those of Italy, Portugal and Sweden – go even 
further. According to its basic law of 1946, Italy is a democratic republic, 
based on labor. The state recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights 
of the person and ensures the performance of the unalterable duties of 
political, economic and social solidarity (Articles 1 and 2).
Thirty years later, in the constitution adopted after the fall of the 
despotic regime Portugal is defined as a sovereign republic, based on 
the dignity of the person and on the will of the people, committed to 
building a free and fair society that unites in solidarity. The achievement 
of economic, social and cultural democracy and the development of 
participatory democracy are proclaimed as core values, which the 
Constitution steps on and guarantees (Art. 1 and 2).
„The form of government», adopted in 1976 in Sweden, does not 
introduce the notion of the welfare state. But the world-famous 
state of common welfare, strengthened during the long rule of the 
social democrats, is established in par. 2 (2) of the Constitution. The 
personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individuals should be 
the fundamental aim of public activities. The state is bound to secure 
for everybody the right to work, housing and education, as well as 
contribute to the social security, safety and good living environment. 
Society should strive for the democratic ideas to become guidelines 
in all spheres of society.
The evolution of the idea and the institutionalization of the principle 
of the welfare state in the theory and practice of French and German 
constitutionalism deserve special attention.
In one of the most authoritative commentaries of the Constitution 
of the Fifth French Republic the idea of the welfare state is seen in the 
context of expanding democracy, which permeates the social sphere, 
along with politics and culture. In a more abstract sense the notion is 
mainly related to the principles of social justice and solidarity.1
The development of social solidarity is an original French contribution 
in sociology and jurisprudence. The concept of social solidarity was 
developed to its fullest in the doctrine of E. Durkheim.2 Looking at 
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the different forms of division of labor and cooperation among social 
groups, he established the need for social solidarity, which is to ensure 
the preservation and progress of society. According to L. Duguit, who 
developed further and introduced social solidarity into legal theory, 
it does not oppose individualism, but combines with it to guarantee 
equality before the law and the rights of citizens in the local, national 
and world community. Law should be based on social solidarity and 
its norms should be consonant with the commandment to not do 
anything, which would harm social solidarity.3 L. Bourjois established 
the need for expanding state intervention to curb the fatal game of 
the economic powers. He saw social solidarity as a mechanism, able 
to ensure social cohesion by combining democracy and economic 
progress.4 In neotomism the welfare state was explained by the need 
for expansion of state functions as a result of industrial progress to 
compensate the disregard of social solidarity and justice.5
Post-Second World War French constitutionalism developed further 
the principles of the welfare state, whose ideologic bases were found 
in solidarism and state interventionism, protecting the freedom of 
vulnerable social groups. In a practical sense social legislation appeared 
as early as after the First World War, although the two organic laws, 
forming the Constitution of the Third French Republic, did not proclaim 
the principle of the welfare state.6
In Germany the constitutional principle of the welfare state is found 
in many different forms. That is why we need to look deeper into its 
emergence, evolution, nature and institutionalization. The welfare 
state is organically related to the principle of the rule of law and has 
its roots back in 19th century. 
Sometimes the creation and development of this concept is, too 
primitively, attributed to Marxism. By explaining historical development 
by class struggle, K. Marx and his followers actually advocated the 
destruction of the unjust system of relations of production. The new 
state of the political rule of the proletariat would, according to them, 
establish the idea of class justice on the ruins of the capitalist society. 
In this sense the totalitarian state is neither a product of the natural 
evolution of the system, where the principle of the welfare state emerged, 
nor even a surrogate of the contemporary welfare state, based on 
market economy and functioning under liberal political democracy. 
Moreover, the demise of the political systems of the states of the so 
called real socialism happened not because of the establishment of 
the welfare state, which is not theoretically impossible, although not 
seen in history, but because they could not sustain the competition 
of the modern welfare state. 
In German constitutionalism the categories of the welfare state and 
the social market economy are seen as a product of the neo liberal, 
social-reformist and catholic doctrine.7
Back in the middle of the last century Lorenz von Stein predicted 
the emergence of the welfare state as the only model to guarantee 
the social peace between the rich and the poor classes. The stability 
of social order and democracy was conditioned on the reality of 
social rights.8 And if at the end of last century constitutionalists saw 
the expansion of basic political rights and especially of the universal 
suffrage as means to politically integrate the poor classes,9 von Stein’s 
prediction was a guarantee for the modernization of market economy 
and the stabilization of democracy.
The modern concept of the welfare state is following up on the 
tradition in German constitutionalism, stemming from the Weimar 
Constitution of 1919. It was one of the first basic laws, which expanded 
the catalogue of people’s fundamental rights, including a number 
of economic and social rights.10 Health, family, maternity, youth and 
labor were placed under the special protection of the society and 
the state (Articles 119, 120, 121, 157). It is the second generation 
of constitutional freedoms – the social rights – that made possible 
the proclamation of the principle of the welfare state. Section V of 
the Constitution, regulating economy, is of particular interest. In a 
sense in contains the basic pre-requisites, from which the principle 
of the modern welfare state crystallizes. The organization of economy 
should reflect justice and guarantee dignified human existence (Art. 
151). Apart from proclaiming the inviolability of private property, 
the Constitution established that property carried certain obligation 
and its usage should serve the interests not only of the owner, but 
also of society (Art. 153). The Basic Law also provided for stimulating 
cooperatives, legislative incentives and protection from oppression of 
the independent middle class in agriculture, industry and commerce 
(Art. 164). The state created a general system of social security for the 
protection of health, workforce and pensioners (Art. 161). The Weimar 
Constitution not only proclaimed employer-employee cooperation in 
regulating the conditions of labour and the wages, but also provided 
for a German initiative in the international regulation of conditions of 
labour and the minimum catalogue of social rights (Art.165 and 162). 
The progressive ideas of the Weimar Constitution did not find its way 
into constitutional practice of a modern welfare state primarily because 
of the economic crisis in Germany after the First World War. Moreover, 
this was such a catastrophe that the Constitution could not ensure the 
self-preservation even of a minimum of the liberal state. The tradition, 
which led to the strengthening of the principle of the welfare state, was 
severed by the totalitarian Third Reich which messiahnistically claimed 
to be sending the mature political democracy of Weimar Germany to 
history, but soon ended up as a historic phenomenon itself.
Post-war constitutionalism in Germany strengthened the principle of 
the welfare state. In discussing the content and scope of the concept, 
the representatives of the various legal and political doctrines not only 
did not refute the principle, but rather strived to clarify its nature so 
that it could be introduced in the legal system. State intervention in the 
social and economic sphere of civil society was justified by the growing 
need to regulate the ever complicating socioeconomic relations in the 
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process of industrialization and urbanization and the 
diminishing importance of the traditional forms of 
care for relatives.11 The discussion about the limits 
and forms of state intervention in the private and 
public sphere seemed most heated.
According to one of the more extreme views, the 
welfare state would mean assessment, ensuring 
and change in the economic relations and the other 
relations they stipulate and would stand against them 
to guarantee dignified human existence, to limit the 
differences into people’s welfare and eliminate or at 
least control the relations of dependence.12
Others think that the constitutional principle of the 
welfare state creates an obligation and legitimizes 
the executive and legislative branches’ meeting the 
requirements of the rule of law while formulating 
the basic principles of social policy.13 The forms of 
state intervention, through which the principle 
of the welfare state is applied, also find different 
interpretations. 
According to the strongest supporters of the idea, 
the state should, through legislation and government, 
plan, re-distribute and compensate so that it could, 
through its sovereign power, reduce social tension and 
inequality and prevent society from self-destruction.14 
Others attribute to the state power much more 
limited possibilities for impact by claiming that the 
constitution only phrases a requirement towards 
political institutions to take into account and act 
within social conditions.15 
Despite the wide spectrum of opinions in the 
discussion the welfare state is always seen within 
the context of Western democracy. The idea that 
the principle of the welfare state may legitimize the 
establishment of totalitarianism was totally alien to 
German constitutionalism after the end of the Second 
World War. 
Such an evolution or transition was refuted not only 
in the theoretic constructs, but was also excluded by 
the very Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
because it violated fundamental principles and norms, 
which regulated people’s rights and the functions 
of political institutions. 
The constitutional principle of the welfare state is 
implemented by the citizens’ social rights and by the 
actions of the political institutions, which adopt special 
social programs, establish a just tax policy, regulate the 
labour market and introduce well-developed labour 
and social security legislation.16
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria of 1991 
proclaims the welfare state expressly in its Preamble 
and implicitly by regulating a number of fundamental 
rights of citizens in the social sphere. 
The institutionalization of the principle of the welfare 
state met a number of objections during the drafting 
of the Constitution. Under the previous regime the 
welfare state was either deemed a poor copy of the 
socialist state because of the “impact and attractive 
example of the socialist regime», or was rejected 
as a revisionist fabrication, masking the doomed 
capitalism, which could not be changed. During the 
transition period of the emerging democracies the 
idea of the welfare state provoked negative reactions 
and was criticized on other grounds. Primarily in a 
propaganda sense and partly because of etymology, 
the term social state was claimed to be a surrogate 
of the socialist state, which was sufficient basis for 
vigorous rejection by anybody, who supported the 
transition to a democratic regime. Formal logic-wise, 
the welfare state was defeated as a mere tautology. 
Once the notion of the welfare state was taken out 
of the context, in which it was used in the developed 
Western democracies, all abstract semantic exercises 
were not only justified, but also gave fruitful grounds 
for speculations. Under one of the reasoning options, 
one logically reaches the conclusion that the mere 
notion of the welfare state is a logical misconception. 
As long as each state supports welfare, the idea of 
the welfare state is redundant.17 The same validity 
was attributed to the statement that since the state is 
an unique sovereign union of community of human 
beings it by definition cannot exist outside the public 
social sphere and in this sense all of the states by 
presumption are social. 
The arguments around the drafting of the Bulgarian 
Constitution of 1991 left the express proclamation of 
the principle of the welfare state only in the Preamble, 
while the rule of law was also provided for in the 
basic law’s text (Art. 4, par. 1). This was undoubtedly 
done with the conviction that the Preamble did not 
and could not have the same binding force as the 
constitutional provisions. And, indeed, the opinion 
that the preamble has not other force than moral, is 
well established among constitutionalists. Whether 
this is so could be a subject of a separate discussion, but, in my opinion, 
only two examples would be sufficient to challenge the axiomatic 
rejection of the binding force of the constitutional preamble.
The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 1958 does not contain a 
section on citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. But they are observed 
pursuant to the short preamble, which precedes the constitutional text. 
„The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the rights 
of Man and the principles of national sovereignty, as formulated by the 
Declaration of 1789, affirmed and complemented by the Preamble to 
the Constitution of 1946.18 Since 1971 the French Constitutional Council 
has always used the Preamble of the Basic Law, when it has proclaimed 
draft laws or other acts, infringing upon citizens’ fundamental rights, 
unconstitutional.19 Therefore, despite the initial view of the drafters that 
the Preamble does not have the legal force of the constitution, nowadays 
it is deemed an organic part of the basic law, having the binding effect 
of the constitutional provisions.20
After the unification of Germany the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany of 1949 was automatically extended over the eastern Länder 
of the former German Democratic Republic. The legal basis for this act is 
contained in the preamble of the constitution, according to which the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany “is in force also for those 
Germans who were denied the opportunity” to take part in the adoption 
of the constitution.
Apart from the Preamble, the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria 
implicitly upholds the principle of the welfare state through proclamation 
and protection of fundamental social rights such as the right to labour (Art. 
48), the right of citizens to form professional associations and syndicates 
(Art. 49), social security and health insurance (Art. 51, Art. 54), etc. The 
fundamental rights of citizens, through which the principle of the welfare 
state is implemented, do not belong to the circle of natural human rights. 
The Constitution and the social legislation have a constitutive effect for 
the emergence of the third generation of rights. Under some reserve, they 
could also be classified under the positive status of the citizen, according 
to the classic construct of G. Jellinek.21
Thus the nature of the constitutional principle of the welfare state is 
clarified primarily in the second generation of constitutional rights, as well 
as through a system of legal guarantees for their implementation and 
the requirements of the basic law, regarding competences, procedures 
and acts of state authorities.
The problem about the implementation of the constitutional provisions 
has at least two aspects. The first looks at the possibility of implementing 
the constitutional provisions, depending on their place in the basic law 
and the degree in which they are supported by other legal norms in 
the normative system. On the other hand, implementation has a totally 
different side – whether social reality itself allows for the constitutional 
stipulations to be fulfilled. Although at first sight this second approach 
can be classified as meta-legal, it is extremely important to take it into 
account, because to a large extent it is that approach, which pre-determines 
the fictionality or reality of the constitutional regulations. Of course, the 
ultimate result is based on the combination of legal and factual aspects 
of the application of law.
The legal side in the implementation of the principle of the welfare state 
is constitutionally protected and can be introduced by the respective 
social, labour and social security legislation.
The actual implementation of the principle of the welfare state in emerging 
democracies in their transition period was problematic. The crisis in the 
economic potential of those democracies, being a core pre-requisite for 
the actual implementation of the principle, was a much stronger argument 
against the proclamation of that principle, which is and will be valid for 
a certain period of time.
The welfare state seemingly contradicts the liberal state. That is why 
the supporters of the old liberalism, and modern conservatism, which 
leans on the long-abandoned views of classic liberalism of the XVIII and 
XIX century, totally reject the welfare state.
The antinomy between the liberal and the welfare state is valid and even 
undisputed only when liberalism itself is reduced to one of its core, but 
not only postulate – the limitation of state interference in the private and 
public sphere. This principle of the liberal doctrine is notorious.
And still the primary good, in the name of which and based on which 
the liberal thinkers develop their whole system of reasoning constructs, 
principles and values, is not the limits of the state interference, but the 
freedom of the citizen. 
The limitation of the government intervention in the private and public 
sphere is called upon to guarantee freedom, but when freedom itself is 
threatened, state interference and legal regulation are justified for the 
same reason – the preservation of individual freedom as a higher social 
value.
One primitive trend of thought sees the difference between the liberal and 
the welfare state mainly as a difference between the weak and the strong 
state power. In fact, such views could hardly find support even among 
the most prominent representatives of classic liberalism, who expressly 
differentiate among the narrowing of the limits of state interference, 
the constitutional limitations of government and the shrinking of state 
functions by the power of the state.22
The practical implementation of the idea of the welfare state or its various 
elements has always followed the opposition among the different political 
powers and has reflected a certain stage in the economic status of the civil 
society. The limited government formula has always involved introduction 
and observance of constitutional limitations on the state, seen mainly as 
apparatus and as legitimate monopoly on violence, in the sense in Max 
Weber, and not as a free association of the members of civil society.
The presence of the concept of the welfare state in the value system 
of modern liberalism, having found its evolution in social liberalism or 
liberal democracy, is an indisputable fact.23 But the roots of the idea 
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of the welfare state could be found in liberal political doctrines, which 
preceded or ran in parallel to the limitation of royal absolutism.
Although undeveloped, this construct is contained in the concept of 
the social contract. The consent to be associated in a state, the transfer 
of some natural rights, which turn into positive, the separation of civil 
society from the state are called upon to guarantee civil freedom, security 
and mutual protection of individuals. In this sense the social nature of 
the state stems from the social contract itself and implies regulation of 
individual freedom to avoid the danger of disintegration or violation of 
peace in society.24
Although undeveloped, state intervention as a guarantee for freedom is 
present even at the initial stages of development of liberal constitutionalism. 
And this is no accident. Along with guaranteeing security, the state 
intervenes in the private sphere also to preserve freedom. The fact that 
the laissez faire policy reflects the tendency for limiting royal absolutism 
and rejects the patriarchal and patrimonial state does not totally exclude 
state intervention. Even the strongest supporters of the minimal state 
do not give political institutions only the role of passive observers of the 
spontaneous development of society. The link between freedom and the 
rudimentary forms of the welfare state is seen in several aspects. Through 
positive law the state sets the limits of individual freedom, since the exercise 
of rights should not infringe upon the freedom of other citizens.25 On the 
other hand, the passion of the liberal theoreticians towards the principles 
of the rule of law explains their position about the interdependence of the 
legal equality and freedom . Finally, due to functional dependency among 
the various spheres of freedom,26 expressed in the different rights, liberal 
doctrine does not ignore or isolate the expansion of social freedom from 
the democratization of political rights. 
The expansion of political freedom necessarily determines the development 
of democracy in other spheres of social life and the increase in the social 
functions of the state.27 That is why it is not surprising that back at the 
beginning of the 19th century one of the, undoubtedly, most famous 
classic liberal constitutionalists, B. Constant,28 introduced and used many 
times the notion of the welfare state, although giving it a meaning, very 
different from the one of the modern state of the “common welfare”. 
Thus freedom, justice, security and later on social solidarity are those 
building elements, which, although underdeveloped, prepared the evolution 
of liberalism. Following industrial development, the doctrine developed 
the principle of the welfare state in modern constitutionalism. That is 
why the traditional antinomy between the liberal and the welfare state 
is largely relative. It is much more precise to distinguish between the 
minimal state and the state, which, as a result of over-etatization and 
violation of the basic principles of political democracy, may degenerate 
into totalitarianism. Practically, there is a vast array of state formations 
between the minimal and the totalitarian state. Somewhere in-between 
are the various degrees and forms of the liberal and the welfare state, but 
neither of them is replacing one of the two extremes. Besides, the practice 
of constitutionalism in the various national states during the different 
stages of historical development is much richer than the two poles of a 
scholastic dichotomy, where only two distinctions are possible between 
the liberal and the welfare state. 
Without any claims to be exhaustive, even less so irrefutable, we could 
differentiate several varieties of state depending on the intensity of the 
intervention in the life of the civil society and in the sphere of civil liberty. 
Parallel to that, the degree of autonomy between liberty and state authority 
should be taken into account when differentiating types of states. The tendency 
towards etatization in a democratic regime is balanced by extending the 
impact of citizens’ political liberty on the formation of political institutions 
and on what they do. Thus the extension of the functions of the state goes 
hand in hand with participatory democracy, which substantially changes 
the functioning of the institutions of political representation.
The minimal state is one of the extremes of the proposed distinction. 
Created at the end of the 18th century and survived in some countries until 
the dawn of the 20th century, it formed as a negation of royal absolutism 
and could exercise only most limited intervention in the life of the civil 
society and in the sphere of civil liberty.29 Political rights were not universal, 
political freedom was a privilege of a relatively narrow circle of citizens, 
which determined the nature of representative government.
At the beginning of the 20th century and especially after the First World 
War the state of political etatization and economic liberalism emerged, 
which was characterized with participatory democracy and extensive 
etatization of political life. The welfare state with participatory democracy, 
exemplary for which are Italy and the Scandinavian states, is a product of 
the evolution of constitutionalism after the Second World War.
The welfare state, which is liberal in its political sphere, involves a combination 
of participatory democracy and developed economic and social functions 
in the economic relations of the civil society and legal guarantees for the 
third generation of fundamental rights. The authoritarian state reflects 
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of the Declaration define that the limits of freedom are determined only by law. 
Montesquieu himself notes that “[l]iberty is a right of doing whatever the laws 
permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed 
of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.” (Ш. Мон-
тескьо. За духа на законите. С., 1984, Р. 225). In his report to the Constitutional 
Committee of 21 June 1789 Seyes noted that the limits of individual freedom are 
where it would not harm the freedom of others (see Великата френска буржо-
азна революция, Избр. документи, С, 1989, с. 160). In the United States Justice 
Holmes used the graphic formula that “[t]he right to swing my fist ends where the 
other man's nose begins.” (М. С. Cummings, D. Wise,  Democracy under Pressure. 
Lexington, 1977. Р. 94).
26As K. Von Rotteck notes, “[t]he concept of social association and its imminent 
collective will involves further the concept of equality and freedom of every 
participant in this association. Respectively, the constitutional system stimulates 
the equal right of participation in the benefits of the state association, the equal 
legal and judicial guarantees for individual freedom and the right to own and 
acquire property …» (К. von Rotteck. Konstitution, Staatslexikon. Altona, 1843, 
v. ІІІ, 767-768; see also for one of the most perfect statements on the correlation 
between equality and freedom in liberalism Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy 
in America. V. II. New York, 1945. Р. 99-100).
27Norberto Bobbio successfully illustrates this interdependence through the gradual 
introduction of the general suffrage. „When only the owners had the right to 
vote, they naturally required from the political power to fulfil one basic function 
– the protection of property. At the moment the illiterate gained suffrage, they 
obviously demanded the state to create free schools. When suffrage was given to 
30Paternalism involves, first and foremost, limitation of individual freedom by the 
state, using arguments about personal, group or social welfare, needs and interests. 
„Paternalism always includes limitation of the freedom of some individuals in 
their own interest, but can also involve an intervention in the freedom of others, 
whose interests are not taken into account» (G. Dworkin in Philosophy of Law, 
ed. J. Feinberg and H.Gross. Belmont, 1992. Р. 232).
the limitation of democracy in the political sphere and cannot exercise 
certain social functions. The paternalistic state has well-developed social 
functions, but the excessive intervention in the sphere of civil liberty leads 
to its limitation and falls into authoritarianism.30
The totalitarian state, which consumes the civil society, limits political 
freedom and destroys the political sphere, is the other extreme of the 
possible distinctions.
The welfare state itself has various degrees of development in the 
constitutional practice of different states. The institutionalization of the 
principle of the welfare state can be done through constitutional proclamation, 
legal regulation of the social sphere and guarantees for the social rights. In 
some cases the principle may include forms of centralized, but not overall 
planning in the economic and social sphere. Finally, a state could be deemed 
social, because, contrary to the minimal state, it possesses substantial social 
functions. In all its variations and nuances it should be seen within the 
context of modern Western democracy. In this sense the welfare state is 
based on individualism, as long as it recognizes and guarantees individual 
rights, while every individualistic state is also a state of welfare, since it is 
based on the social contract and should ensure public welfare.
Due to the unprecedented character of the transition to democracy, 
constitutionalism in emerging democracies shows a number of unexpected 
deviations from the classic principles and functions of the state. On one 
hand, the opening of politics, the lifting of the limitations on political 
freedom and the affirmation of participatory democracy meet the modern 
requirements and standards of international law and the best constitutional 
models. On the other hand, due to the economic crisis and the difficulties of 
transition to market economy the social functions of the state in the former 
communist countries seem to be at a stage, which Western democracies 
are far ahead of. The state cannot be social, but it is even less minimal. The 
state has to intensively intervene in the economic sphere, although in a 
completely different manner from the consumption of the civil society 
and the direct administration of economy under the old regime. 
Due to the old stereotype that the individual welfare depends not on 
the individual initiative, but on the benevolence of the state and due to 
the expectations towards that same state to eliminate the difficulties of 
transition, the application of the principle of the welfare state may deform. 
Due to collectivistic attitudes and egalitarian illusions instead of equal 
chances in life to individuals, different in their capacities, the principle may 
hypertrophize the re-distribution functions of economy in the name of 
elimination of the differences in the results, which are so natural for the 
market economy. Another possible deviation, which profanes the principles, 
would be the substitution of the social for a paternalistic state. Thus the 
welfare state can be deformed even without introducing totalitarianism 
or authoritarian regime. While a paternalistic state, which lifts all limits to 
etatization in the name of freedom is actually a bigger evil than the one 
it tries to overcome.
Despite all reservations, stemming from the state of the economic potential 
and the psychological particularities of the emerging democracies, which 
sometimes turn the principle of the welfare state into a constitutional fiction 
or lead to deformations in the underdeveloped forms of its application, 
the future market economy and political democracy will strengthen it. 
In the national states, as well as in the European Union as an association 
of welfare states. It will outlive the ideologic arguments not because it is 
a reminiscence of the socialist state, but because the security of society, 
the social justice, the freedom and democracy could hardly be preserved, 
if the future state of the rule of law is not also a state of welfare and the 
community of national states in the European Union is not an association 
of welfare states.
In conclusion, the principle of the welfare state should always be analyzed 
in accordance with the other basic principles of constitutional democracy 
under globalization and European integration within the context of the 
multi-level constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism. One of the trends 
in constitutional analysis and the exploration of the community law is 
the study of the correlation between the national and the supranational 
guarantees of social rights, on one hand, and the content of the rights 
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. 
Е. Танчев: Қазіргі конституционализмдегі әлеуметтік мемле-
кет. 
Мақалада бір жағынан минималды (бұрын-либералды) мемлекеттің 
антиподтары болып табылатын және екінші жағынан, патерналистік-
тоталитарлық мемлекет әлеуметтік мемлекет пен әлеуметтік игілікті 
(гүлденген) мемлекет тұжырымдамасының мазмұны мен институци-
онализациясы зерттеледі. 
Әлеуметтік мемлекеттің француз және неміс ұғымдарының эво-
люциясы мен конституционализациясына талдау жасалады. 1991 ж. 
Болгария Республикасының қолданыстағы конституциясын жасау 
кезіндегі пікірталастардың мазмұнын ашуға арнайы көңіл бөлінген. 
Бұл пікірталастар басқа сипаттамалар мен конституциялық қағидаттар 
конституция нормаларында мағлұмдалғанда, неге әлеуметтік мем-
лекет тек конституцияның қосымшасында жария етіледі дегенді 
түсінудің кілті болып табылады. Әлеуметтік мемлекеттің адамның 
әлеуметтік және экономикалық құқықтарының екінші буынымен 
байланысына тоқталады.  
Түйінді сөздер: конституция, әлеуметтік, мемлекет, қағидат, негізгі 
құқықтар, Болгария, Германия, Франция, Испания, Еуропалық Одақ, 
адам құқықтарын қорғау туралы Еуропалық конвенция, негізгі құқықтар 
Хартиясы.
Е. Танчев: Социальное государство в современном конститу-
ционализме. 
     В статье исследуется содержание и институционализация концеп-
ции социального государства и государства социального благоден-
ствия (процветания), которые являются антиподами минимального 
(ранее -либерального) государства, с одной стороны и патерналистко-
тоталитарного государства, с другой стороны. Проводится анализ эво-
люции и конституционализации французского и немецкого понятий 
социального государства. Специальное внимание уделено раскры-
тию содержания дебатов при создании действующей конституции 
Республики Болгария 1991 г. Эти дебаты являются ключом к пони-
манию того, почему социальное государство прокламируется толь-
ко в преамбуле конституции в то время как другие характеристики и 
конституционные принципы декларируются в нормах конституции. 
Прослеживается связь социального государства со вторым поколе-
нием социальных и экономических прав человека.
Ключевые слова: конституция, социальное, государство, принцип, 
основные права, Болгария, Германия, Франция, Испания, Европей-
ский Союз, Европейская конвенция о защите прав человека, Хар-
тия основных прав. 
those, which did not own anything except their manpower, they demanded the 
state to protect them from unemployment and give them social security for illness, 
pensions, protection of maternity, opportunities to acquire affordable housing, 
etc.» (N. Bobbio. II futuro della democrazia. Torino, 1985. Р. 24).
28Of course, the principle of the welfare state is seen through the prism of historical 
development. Constant saw the welfare state first and foremost in the guarantees 
for freedom, in the extension of the general suffrage, the equality among all types 
of property and the exclusion of monopolies. Besides, with his inherent sense 
of dynamics in the historical development he concluded that „. … many of the 
things, which seem well needed, will become obsolete, while many of those, 
which seem problematic, paradoxical or even criminal, will become needed « (В. 
Constant. Oeuvres, еd. A. Roulin. Paris, 1957. Р. 838).
29One of the best descriptions of the minimal state was given by W. von Humboldt 
(В. фон Гумбольдт. Идеи к опиту, определяющему граници деятельности го-
сударства. – В: Язык и философия культуры, Москва, 1985. С. 25-141.
